Abstract. In this work, we consider Wardrop games where traffic has to be routed through a shared network. Traffic is allowed to be split into arbitrary pieces and can be modeled as network flow. For each edge in the network there is a latency function that specifies the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion. In a Wardrop equilibrium, all used paths between a given source-destination pair have equal and minimal latency. In this paper, we allow for polynomial latency functions with an upper bound d and a lower bound s on the degree of all monomials that appear in the polynomials. For this environment, we prove upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy.
Introduction
Motivation and Framework. The price of anarchy, also known as coordination ratio, has been defined in the seminal work by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [14] as a measure of the extent to which competition approximates cooperation. In general, the price of anarchy is the worst-case ratio between the value of a social objective function, usually coined as social cost, in some equilibrium state of a system, and that of some social optimum. Usually, the equilibrium state has been taken to be that of a Nash equilibrium [16] -a state in which no user wishes to unilaterally leave its own strategy in order to improve the value of its private objective function, also known as individual cost. So, the price of anarchy represents a rendezvous of Nash equilibrium, a concept fundamental to Game Theory, with approximation, an ubiquitous concept in Theoretical Computer Science today (see, e.g., [22] ).
The Wardrop model has already been studied in the context of road traffic systems by Pigou [17] in the 1920's and later by Wardrop [23] , and by Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten [3] in the 1950's. For a survey of the early work on this model see [4] . In the Wardrop model, traffic has to be sent through a shared network and traffic is allowed to be split into arbitrary pieces. In this environment, unregulated traffic is modeled as network flow. Wardrop [23] introduced the concept of Wardrop equilibrium to describe user behavior in this kind of traffic networks. Given an arbitrary network with edge latency functions, Wardrop equilibria have been classified as flows with all flow paths used between a given source-destination pair having equal latency. A Wardrop equilibrium can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium in a game with infinitely many users, each carrying an infinitesimal amount of traffic from a source to a destination.
Inspired by the arisen interest in the price of anarchy, Roughgarden and Tardos [21] re-investigated the Wardrop model and used the total latency as their social objective function. The total latency is a measure for the total travel time. In this context, the exact value for the price of anarchy was shown for linear latency functions by Roughgarden and Tardos [21] and for arbitrary polynomial latency functions with nonnegative coefficients and maximum degree d by Roughgarden [19] . In his book [20, Chapter 3] , Roughgarden gives the following rule of thumb:
The price of anarchy is small unless cost functions are extremely steep.
In this work, we examine this rule of thumb closer by re-considering the price of anarchy for polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d. However, in contrast to the latency functions considered by Roughgarden [19] , our latency functions have also a minimum degree of s. For large d these latency functions are extremely steep, however, we show that in many cases the price of anarchy remains small. Related Work. The price of anarchy was introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [14] and received a lot of attention in various routing games (see e.g. [1, 2, 5-10, 12, 13, 15, 19, 21] ).
Early work on the Wardrop model has been done in the context of road traffic systems [3, 4, 17, 23] . Beckmann et al. [3] showed that a Wardrop equilibrium always exists and that it is essentially unique. These results were based on the observation that a Wardrop equilibrium is a solution to a related convex program.
For the Wardrop model, with social cost as total latency, Roughgarden and Tardos [21] showed that the price of anarchy is exactly 4 3 in case of linear latency functions. For the case of polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d, Roughgarden [19] showed that the price of anarchy is
. Interestingly, in both cases, the price of anarchy is independent of the network topology, as it is achieved on the simple network of two parallel links [19, 21] . Correa et al. [6] improved the bounds from [19] on the price of anarchy for the special case of polynomial latency functions without constant term and for d ≤ 4. The price of anarchy was also studied for latency functions that arise as delay functions of M/M/1 queues [19] . For arbitrary nondecreasing latency functions Roughgarden and Tardos [21] showed that the total latency in a Wardrop equilibrium is upper bounded by the optimum total latency for the instance where all traffic demands are doubled.
Related to Wardrop games are (weighted) congestion games as introduced by Rosenthal [18] . In a congestion game, there is a set of resources and players can choose as their strategy a set of resources from a given set of subsets of resources. Awerbuch et al. [2] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [5] were the first to study the price of anarchy for congestion games. They showed asymptotic tight bounds on the price of anarchy for congestion games with polynomial latency functions in case of unweighted [2, 5] and in case of weighted player demands [2] . With a more careful analysis, Aland et al. [1] were able to derive the exact value for the price of anarchy in both cases. For a survey on weighted congestion games, we refer to [11] . Contribution. In this paper, we study the price of anarchy for Wardrop games with polynomial latency functions in more detail. In particular, we consider polynomials that consist of monomials of maximum degree d and minimum degree s. All our latency functions have nonnegative coefficients. We will call such polynomials (d, s)-polynomials.
As our first result, we show that for general (d, s)-polynomials, the price of anarchy (PoA(d,s)) is upper bounded by
To achieve this result, we adopt a technique that was already used in [1] and that is again based on a technique from [5] . The core of our analysis is to determine parameters c 1 and c 2 , such that
for all (d, s)-polynomials f and for all reals y, z ≥ 0. 
For instance, this gives upper bounds of 1.0614756 and 1.159983 for a = 2 and a = 3, respectively. We close our paper with a discussion on lower bounds on the price of anarchy for Wardrop games with (d, s)-polynomials. Here, we use the very simple network of two parallel links. So far, we could not show that our general upper bound yields the exact value for the price of anarchy; however, numerical analysis for all (d, s)-polynomials with d ≤ 30 gives a strong indication that this is the case.
For (d, s) . Roadmap. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Wardrop model. Section 3.1 presents the upper bound on the price of anarchy, whereas Section 3.2 discusses lower bounds. We conclude in Section 4 with a summary of our results and some open problems. Due to lack of space, we omit some proofs. They can be found in the appendix.
Notation
For all k ∈ N denote [k] = {1, . . . , k}. Routing with Splittable Traffic. A Wardrop game is a tuple Γ = (n, G, w, P, f ). Here, n is the number of players and G = (V, E) is an undirected (multi)graph. The vector w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) defines for every player i ∈ [n] its traffic w i ∈ R + . For each player i ∈ [n] the set P i ⊂ 2 E consists of all possible routing paths in G = (V, E) from some node s i ∈ V to some other node t i ∈ V . Denote P = P 1 × . . . × P n . Denote by f = {f e | e ∈ E} the set of differentiable, monotone increasing and nonnegative edge latency functions. In this paper, we allow for polynomial latency functions with nonnegative coefficients, where monomials of degree less than s are missing; that is, latency functions are of the form f e (x) = d i=s a ie x i with a ie ≥ 0 for all integers s ≤ i ≤ d and all edges e ∈ E. We will call such latency functions (d, s)-polynomials. Strategies and Strategy Profiles. A player i ∈ [n] can split its traffic w i over the paths in P i . A strategy for player i ∈ [n] is a tuple x i = (x iPi ) Pi∈Pi with Wardrop Equilibria. For a strategy profile x, the load l e (x) on an edge e ∈ E is given by l e (x) = i∈[n] Pi∈Pi,Pi e x iPi . A strategy profile x is a Wardrop equilibrium, if for every player i ∈ [n], and every P i , P i ∈ P i with x iPi > 0 it holds that
Observe that in a Wardrop equilibrium all flow paths of a player have equal latency. We can regard each player i ∈ [n] as a service provider who has many clients each handling a negligible small amount of traffic. In a Wardrop equilibrium, each service provider satisfies all his clients because none of them can improve its experienced latency. Social Cost and Price of Anarchy. For a strategy profile x, define the social cost SC(x) as the total latency; thus,
This social cost is motivated by the interpretation as a game with infinitely many players with negligible demand and models the sum of the players latencies. The optimum associated with a game is defined by OPT = min x∈X SC(x). The price of anarchy, also called coordination ratio and denoted PoA, is the maximum value, over all instances and Wardrop equilibria x, of the ratio
OPT . For the class of Wardrop games, where all latency functions are (d, s)-polynomials, denote by PoA(d, s) the price of anarchy with respect to d and s.
Price of Anarchy

Upper Bound
Before proving a general upper bound on the price of anarchy for Wardrop games with (d, s)-polynomial latency functions, we have to prove the following technical lemma:
∀y, z ∈ R>0 (1) and
Then, it follows that
Proof. Since
is equivalent to
it suffices to show that
This follows by replacing z y ∈ R >0 with a new z ∈ R >0 . Furthermore, it follows from (1) and (2) that
∀z ∈ R>0. Fix an arbitrary i ∈ N with s ≤ i ≤ d. We proceed by case study dependent on z ∈ R >0 .
First assume that z ≤ 1. Let i = s + j, then 0 ≤ j ≤ d − s. We get
We get
This completes the proof of the lemma.
We are now ready to prove our general upper bound on the price of anarchy.
Theorem 1. For Wardrop games with (d, s)-polynomial latency functions, we have
Proof. Observe, that for s = 0 our upper bound on the price of anarchy reduces to the exact value on the price of anarchy that was proved by Roughgarden [19] for this case. So, in the following, we assume that s ≥ 1. Let x = (x 1P1 , . . . , x nPn ) be a Wardrop equilibrium and let x * = (x * 1P1 , . . . , x * nPn ) be a strategy profile with optimum social cost. Since x is a Wardrop equilibrium, it follows by definition of a Wardrop equilibrium that
. Now, since l e (x * ) and l e (x) are both positive real numbers, assume that c 1 and c 2 are such that
for all polynomials f with minimum degree s and maximum degree d, having nonnegative coefficients. Then,
and with 0 < c 1 < 1 it follows that
Since x is an arbitrary Wardrop equilibrium, we get
We will now show how to determine c 1 and c 2 such that inequality (3) holds and that the resulting upper bound is minimal. In case y = 0 equation (3) follows immediately from c 1 ≥ 0 and z ≥ 0. In case z = 0 the left hand side yields y · f (0) = 0, since by the degree of the lowest monomial being s ≥ 1 there are no additive constants in the latency functions. This is always less or equal than c 2 · y · f (y), since latency functions are monotone increasing, y ≥ 0 and c 2 ≥ 0. So, in the following we assume that y > 0 and z > 0. In order to show that (3) holds, it suffices to show that (3) holds for all monomials of degree i ∈ [n] with s ≤ i ≤ d, since polynomials are a linear combination of monomials. This implies that (3) then holds also for the considered polynomials. By Lemma 1 it suffices to show this for the monomials of degree s and d. Consider inequality (3) for a single monomial f (z) = a i · z i , which we divide by a i · y i+1 yielding " z y
Setẑ := z y . Thenẑ ∈ R >0 and (3) reduces tô
We now view (5) as a function in i, c 1 andẑ, since we want to determine the maximumẑ such that inequality (3) holds. Thus, we have the following function
which we partially differentiate inẑ in order to retrieve the minimum c 2 such that (5) holds, yielding
Theẑ for which c 2 is maximum can now be easily determined to beẑ
. Simple insertion in (6) yields
Lemma 1 states that it suffices to focus on the monomials of degree s and d in order for (3) to hold. We therefore determine c 1 as a solution to the equation of c 2 (d, c 1 ) = c 2 (s, c 1 ). Thus, we have
Having calculated c 1 , we can retrieve c 2 by simple insertion in (7) using the maximum degree d of the monomials yielding
We get with (4) that
which completes the proof of the theorem.
Having proved the general upper bound, we now investigate the case s = 
Lower Bound
For the lower bound, we consider an instance of a Wardrop game with n = 1 player of traffic w 1 = 1. The network consists of two parallel edges u and from node s 1 to node t 1 . The latency functions are f u (x) = α · x s and f (x) = x d , where α ∈ R >0 will be determined later. With a slight abuse of notation, let z = (z, 1 − z) be a Wardrop equilibrium and let z = ( z, 1 − z) be the optimum strategy profile, where z (resp. z) is the amount of traffic that is assigned to link u in the Wardrop equilibrium (resp. optimum).
In the Wardrop equilibrium, the latency on both links is the same, so z is the only positive solution to
On the other hand, the optimum is defined by
which yields that z is the only positive solution to
Observe, that z and z are both dependent on α, s and d. If we can compute z and z, then we can give a lower bound on the price of anarchy
